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The Ease of Entry Doctrine in Merger
Law: Managing the Waste of In Re
Echlin

Victor Hsu*
The most significant new issue in merger analysis is ease of entry.
Recent cases have enshrined it as an absolute rebuttal against high
market concentration figures which would otherwise block a merger.
If the present trend continues, antitrust litigation under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act' will focus not on niarket definition or efficiencies,
but on assessing the height of entry barriers.
This Article surveys the developing case law on ease of entry and
points out certain flaws which should be addressed. An extended
discussion of the significance of entry barriers follows, and the Article
concludes with suggestions for reform.
I.

THE DEVELOPING CASE LAW

Entry conditions are fundamental to any sophisticated analysis of
market power. In the absence of significant barriers, any attempt by
existing firms in a market to charge a supra-competitive price generally induces new firms to enter the market. These entrants should
dissipate excess profits and bid the price back down to competitive
levels. Many early cases did not acknowledge the importance of entry

* A.B., Princeton University, 1983; M.P.P.M., Yale School of Organization and Management, 1987; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987. The author is an associate at the firm of
O'Melveny & Meyers, Los Angeles, California.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1988).
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in assessing market power.2 Instead the focus was on market concentration.3 Entry was only mentioned4 to reinforce predetermined
conclusions that market power existed.
In the late 1970s, courts began to pay more attention to entry

issues in merger cases. Unfortunately, they had to labor under a
cloud of misguided precedent. As one commentator noted:
The mistaken notion that every step a new entrant must take to
enter a market amounts to a substantial entry barrier pervades many
court and FTC opinions. As a consequence, the decisions-while
often purporting to apply Bain's basic methodology for assessing
entry barriers-actually have distorted it into a "laundry list"
approach to barrier analysis.-

In 1982, the Department of Justice issued new merger guidelines
which gave explicit consideration to market entry. Concentration was
still the primary focus, but ease of entry became the most important
secondary factor in deciding whether to block a merger. The new
guidelines provided the following rule of thumb: "If entry into a
market is so easy that existing competitors could not succeed in
raising prices for any significant period of time, the Department is
'6
unlikely to challenge mergers in that market."
The 1982 Merger Guidelines combined the issue of entry with the
issue of market power: "In assessing the ease of entry to a market,
the Department will consider the likelihood and probable magnitude
of entry in response to a small but significant and nontransitory
increase in price. ' 7 In practice, this usually means a five percent
price increase sustained for two years.
2. The two leading merger cases of the 1960s were the Supreme Court's decisions in'Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) and United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966). These cases have been roundly criticized for their flawed economic analysis.
See, e.g., R. BORK, Ta ArrTur PARADox 210-18 (1978); R. POSNEaR, ANTImRUsT LAW 100-

10 (1976). One major error was the lack of adequate consideration given to entry conditions. In
Brown Shoe, the opinion mentioned entry as a relevant factor but then failed to apply entry
analysis to the shoe retailing market. Von's Grocery neglected entry entirely.
3. Wentz, Mobility Factors in Antitrust Cases: Assessing Market Power in Light of
ConditionsAffecting Entry and FringeExpansion, 80 MIcH. L. Ray. 1545, 1556 (1982). See In
re Ecko Products Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1206-09 (1964) ("where the merger's effects on competition
are those proscribed by Section 7, its illegality cannot be overcome by a showing of ease of
entry"), aff'd 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
4. Wentz, supra note 3, at 1556-57. The Supreme Court recognized the importance of ease
of entry only in cases involving the potential competition doctrine, which has very limited
application. See United States v. Marine Bancorp, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); In re B.A.T.
Indus., 104 F.T.C. 852 (1984).
5. Wentz, supra note 3, at 1558-59 (footnote omitted).
6.

UNTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES § III B (1982), reprinted

in 4 TRADE REG. RaP. (CCH) 13,102 at 20,537 (1988) [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines].
7. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Though the Federal Trade Commission did not quantitatively mingle ease of entry with concentration, it followed the Justice Department's lead in emphasizing the importance of entry analysis. According
to the 1982 FTC Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers: "The
issue of entry barriers is perhaps the most important qualitative
factor, for if entry barriers are very low it is unlikely that market
power, whether individually or collectively exercised, will persist for
long." 8 These policy changes represented a significant step toward
an economically correct approach to entry issues in merger cases.
Several cases decided after the announcement of the new Justice
Department and FTC guidelines explicitly recognized that concentration ratios may not accurately reflect market power if barriers to
entry are very low. 9
In 1984, minor changes were made to the Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines. 10 Those revisions did not have any impact on the
treatment of entry, but a Second Circuit case decided the same year
had a tremendous impact, expanding the significance of entry to new
frontiers. In United States v. Waste Management, Inc.," the court
held that a post-merger market share of nearly fifty percent and
3,040 points on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was not illegal since
the market was characterized by ease of entry.
The Waste Management case involved a merger between two Texas
firms in the waste disposal business. The district court found the
post-merger market share based on revenue data to reach 48.8 percent
and held the merger to be prima facie illegal under the market
concentration standard of United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank.'2 Judge Griesa conceded that "entry into the trash collection
business is relatively easy, and the barriers to entry not great."' 3 Yet
he rejected the contention that this fact had any economic or legal
significance:

8. FTC STATEMENT CONCERNING HORIZONTAL MERGERS § III A(1) (1982), reprinted in 4
13,200 at 20,902 (1988) [hereinafter FTC STATENT].
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
9. See, e.g., In re Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812 (1983); In re Weyerhaeuser Co., 106
F.T.C. 172 (1985); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1985); Ball
Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
10. See UNITED STATES DEPARTmr OF JusTicE MERGER GuIDELINns § 3.3 (1984), reprinted
13,103 at 20,562 (1988).
in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
11. 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).

12. United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 498, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),
rev'd, 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984). See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
364-66 (1963).

13.

Waste Management, 588 F. Supp. at 513.
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There is no showing of any circumstance, related to ease of entry
or the trend of the business, which promises in and of itself to
materially erode the competitive strength of [the merged firms].
With regard to the legal effect of low entry barriers and potential
competition in a section 7 case, there is no persuasive authority for
allowing such factors to overcome a strong prima facie showing of
concentration in the existing competitive structure.' 4
The appellate court reversed, holding that ease of entry may rebut
a showing of prima facie illegality.15 Judge Winter's reasoning relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp. 6 and the potential competition cases. General Dynamics held that market share data may be rebutted by proof that
they do not accurately reflect the effect on competition of a proposed
merger. The teaching of the potential entrant doctrine is that firms
not presently in the market should be considered in calculating market
share if they are likely to enter in response to a price increase by
market incumbents. The Second Circuit amplified these themes and
concluded that ease of entry rendered the government's concentration
figures immaterial:
[W]e believe that entry into the relevant product and geographic
market by new firms or by existing firms in the Fort Worth area
is so easy that any anti-competitive impact of the merger before us
would be eliminated more quickly by such competition than by
litigation.'7

The opinion was obviously informed by Chicago School economics.
In response to the argument that entry into the market has been
infrequent, Judge Winter explained: "The fact that such entry has
not happened more frequently reflects only the existence of competitive, entry-forestalling prices.18 Judge Winter hoisted the Justice
Department with its own petard by raising the Merger Guidelines as
a quasi-estoppel argument:
[Tihe Merger Guidelines issued by the government itself not only
recognize the economic principle that ease of entry is relevant to
appraising the impact upon competition of a merger but also state
that it may override all other factors .... If the Department of
Justice routinely considers ease of entry as relevant to determining

14. Id.
15. Waste Management, 743 F.2d at 982.
16. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
17. Waste Management, 743 F.2d at 983.
18. Id.
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the competitive impact of a merger, it may not argue to a court
addressing the same issue that ease of entry is irrelevant.19

The Waste Management opinion has had a dramatic effect. It has
transformed ease of entry from merely a factor the government
would consider before challenging a merger into a powerful affirmative defense. Since the Reagan Administration challenges relatively
few mergers, the presence of such a defense may significantly weaken
whatever legal restraints against horizontal mergers which remain.
An important victory for the Waste Management approach came
less than five months later in United States v. Calmar Inc.20 The
district court allowed a merger which gave the merging firms over
50 percent market share in an already concentrated industry, because
entry into the market was "relatively easy." ' 2, With Waste Management as his sole authority, Judge Debevoise held: "If ease of entry
in the market is such that the producers in the market could not
long sustain an unjustified price increase, then in spite of a high
degree of concentration there has not been a substantial lessening of
22
competition."
Ease of entry was also dispositive in In re Echlin Manufacturing
Co.,23 decided by the Federal Trade Commission. The sole dissenting
Commissioner pointed out that the merger would involve "competing
firms with 36% and 10% of a small and declining market so highly
concentrated that six firms account for 95% of sales. The HerfindahlHirschman index as a result of this acquisition rises by over 750
points to just under 3000. " 24 Yet the rest of the Commission could
abide by such concentration after determining "that there are no
barriers to entry into the [market]." 2
Not only has ease of entry become a powerful defense, it has also
been suggested that the obverse, difficulty of entry, may be necessary
for a prima facie case. In Saltz & Sons, Inc. v. Hart Schaffner &
Marx,26 the district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss,
19. Id. at 982-83.
20. 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985). Another example of the growing acceptance of the
Waste Management doctrine is the recent opinion of Judge Williams in McCaw Personal
Communications, Inc. v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp. 1166 (N.D.Cal. 1986).
21. Calmar, 612 F. Supp. at 1305.
22. Id. at 1301.
23. 105 F.T.C. 410 (1985). Echlin is the only ease of entry case which devotes a significant
part of its opinion to the economics of entry. It will be analyzed in more detail in the next
section of this Article.
24. Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 492 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting).
25. Id. at 480.
26. 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,768 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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finding that "the degree of concentration is insufficient to warrant
antitrust relief. ' 27 Continuing the opinion in dictum, Judge Cannella
relied on Waste Management and stated, "Finally, even had plaintiff
shown market concentrations indicative of the anticompetitive impact
of the acquisition, the lack of any significant barrier to entry would
preclude a finding of an antitrust violation .... Plaintiff has pointed
to no barriers nor presented evidence of significant difficulty of

entry.' '28
It is clear that courts have taken the Waste Management doctrine
and run with it as far as it will go, perhaps farther than a careful
reading of the holding would permit. The holding itself probably
goes farther than its factual and analytical basis would permit.2 9 The

case may have been correctly decided, but it was not correctly
reasoned. Judge Winter's opinion lacks detail and rigor, and its
cryptic conciseness about a matter as complex as market entry renders
it a poor guide for future decisions.
While low entry barriers may indeed prevent a concentrated market
from supporting supra-competitive prices, the question which is ignored in all the cases discussed above is how low is "low"? If a

finding of "ease of entry" or "low entry barriers" is sufficient to
overcome prima facie illegality under Section 7, those terms of art
must be given substance and quantitative meaning. Otherwise, merger
inquiries will degenerate into a battle of the experts over obscure and
subjective evaluations of "low"

and "high"

barriers. Judges will

have the discretion to rewrite the antitrust laws to their liking, and
litigants will go on sprees of forum shopping.

Unfortunately, the limited judicial authority on ease of entry after
Waste Management indicates that this is the direction the law is
taking. The cases make no attempt to measure the height of entry
27. Id. at 63,724.
28. Id. See also Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 1985)
(in order to prove market power "plaintiff must show a barrier to entry that prevents competition"); Schmalensee, Ease of Entry: Has the Concept Been Applied Too Readily?, 56 ANTrrRUST
L.J. 41, 50-51 (1987) (burden of proving entry barriers seems to be shifting to plaintiff). Since
Waste Management stated that concentration alone could prove prima facie illegality under
Section 7, it is unclear why the plaintiff should be required to buttress his case by attacking an
affirmative defense not yet raised. Judge Cannella raised no economic or legal justification for
shifting the burden to the plaintiff. The Department of Justice, which has ambivalent feelings
about ease of entry, has not accepted the Saltz & Sons rule. See Leddy, Entry Issues in Merger
Analysis, 54 ANm-usT L.J. 1257, 1259 (1986) ("The defendant has the burden of proof on
entry in Section 7 cases.").
29. See Calkins, Developments in Merger Litigation: The Government Doesn't Always Win,
56 A nrrrsT L.J. 855, 863, n.45 (1987); Rule, Merger Enforcement Policy: Protecting the
Consumer, 56 ArnTRusT L.J. 739, 749 (1987).
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barriers in order to distinguish high from low.30 Instead, "low entry
barriers" and "ease of entry" have become talismanic incantations
which amount to a test of per se legality for many mergers. 3
II.

A.

SHOULD EASE OF ENTRY ALWAYS TRUMP CONCENTRATION?

The Justice Department View-Ease versus Likelihood

It was the Reagan Administration Justice Department which brought
entry issues to the fore, so it is ironic that their own creation has
come back to haunt them. Actually, the entry issues which the
Antitrust Division emphasized in 1982 related to proper market
definition and did not directly implicate market power. There was a
concern that rigid market definition would systematically understate
the competitive impact of potential entrants. 32 The 1982 Merger
Guidelines took entry barriers into account in order to correct this
problem. 3
The entry analysis discussed in Waste Management and its progeny
does not concern market definition, but the lack of market power
despite concentration. It is common knowledge among economists
that entry barriers are a prerequisite for monopoly pricing.3 4 What
Waste Management stands for is the converse: the absence of entry
barriers absolutely prevents any supra-competitive pricing. This proposition is much more controversial, depending upon how entry barriers are defined.
The Department of Justice maintains that Waste Management and
Calmar were wrongly decided because the courts misread the Merger
Guidelines. As Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mark Leddy explains:
Section 3.3 [of the 1984 Merger Guidelines] says that if entry is so
easy that firms in the market will be deterred from colluding for
30. Schmalensee, supra note 28, at 47. For a survey of the recent cases on ease of entry,
see Briggs, An Overview of Current Law and Policy Relating to Mergers and Acquisitions, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 657, 666-67, 679-80 (1987).
31. In re Echlin Manufacturing Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 502 (1985) (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting).
32. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937
(1981).
33. See 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES § III B, supra note 6 (potential entrants "are included
in the market and given a market share"). See also Leddy, supra note 28, at 1257.
34. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNoMIc PERFORMANCE
11 (2d ed. 1980).
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fear that higher prices will bring in more competition, then we
won't challenge the merger. This does not mean that if entry is
physically easy to accomplish, then any increase in concentration is
automatically acceptable. That is how I think the courts in Waste
Management and Calmar characterized the entry questions, and that
is where they went wrong. The pertinent question is how likely
entry is. One must read in Section 3.3-the second paragraph says
that it is the "likelihood and probable magnitude" of entry that

matter.35
Mr. Leddy's statement raises two issues. First, antitrust law is
what Congress and the courts say it is, no matter how vigorously
the Department of Justice might disagree. The Merger Guidelines
may be given the force of law by judicial application and acceptance,
but they do not constitute law by themselves. 36 Second, the distinction
the Department raises between ease of entry and likelihood of entry
is curious. If markets are functioning properly, ease of entry should
presuppose likelihood of entry if prices rise.
In a recent interview, former Assistant Attorney General (and now
D.C. Circuit Judge) Douglas Ginsburg described one case where there
would be no probability of entry despite low barriers: "In an industry
where there are no legal or other barriers to entry, but where the
short-run marginal cost is below long-run marginal cost-for examto be any entry in
ple, in a declining industry-there isn't going
' 37
increase."
price
percent
five
a
to
response
Judge Ginsburg incorrectly implies that there should be entry in
such a situation, in order to bid down the price increase. A competitive price is one which equals long-run marginal cost; forcing
firms to price at short-run marginal cost will inevitably lead to
bankruptcy. In declining industries, mergers can enhance efficiency
by cheaply adjusting supply markets to meet decreased demand. Price
increases under these circumstances are not necessarily monopoly
rents. They may simply reflect the loss of scale economies and other

35. Leddy, supra note 28, at 1258.
36. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); AllisChalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Ind., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 524 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied
396 U.S. 1009 (1970). In fact, the Reagan Administration has proposed a bill which would
essentially codify the 1984 Merger Guidelines. See Reagan Administration Unveils Antitrust
Reform Package; Rodino Attacks Proposals, 50 ANTITRUST & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) No.
1253, 307-08 (1986); Baldridge, Ginsberg Defend Antitrust Package; Democrats Try to Unravel
It, 50 A TrRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1260, 627-29 (1986) (discussing H.R. 4247, S.
2160, The Merger Modernization Act of 1986).
37. 60 Minutes with Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
55 ANrrrRUsr L.J. 255, 272 (1986).
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factors which would have permitted lower prices if demand were
stronger, or they may represent the end of cutthroat price wars and
a return to competitive equilibrium after a market shake-out.
The distinction between ease of entry and likelihood of entry has
no economic basis. To the extent that market power is the issue,
likelihood of entry is irrelevant. 38 Entry is unlikely in a saturated,
fiercely competitive market, as well as a declining, unprofitable
market. Entry is also unlikely if barriers are high. Yet it is unclear
why firms would not enter a market characterized by low barriers
and high profits. Basic microeconomic theory teaches that entry
39
would be quite likely.
Thus, the Department of Justice would not consider ease of entry
to be dispositive if there is no corresponding likelihood of entry.
This analysis fails to address the complexity of the issue. Perhaps
the Justice Department is more sophisticated than it appears, however, and is saying "when we argue that there is no likelihood of
entry, we really believe that there is no ease of entry, despite what
the factfinder says." The ease/likelihood distinction may be a way
for the government to get a second bite at the apple once it has lost
on the facts. This subtle ploy is admirable, since it is likely that the
courts have been too quick to find low barriers to entry in the cases
discussed above. Unfortunately, the ploy, if that is what it is, has
not been successful. It does not appear that the Department has
40
refined its approach since losing the Calmar case.
B.

The Federal Trade Commission View-Unqualified
Endorsement

In contrast to the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission seems to consider ease of entry by itself sufficient to guard
38. Commissioner Douglas implicitly rebuked the Justice Department's ease/likelihood distinction in Echlin Manufacturing Co., 105 F.T.C. at 485:
Complaint counsel suggests that entry barriers are high whenever it is unlikely that
new firms will decide to enter the market. We cannot agree. Although high barriers
indicate that entry is unlikely, reversing that statement goes too far. For example,
entry would be most unlikely if all the incumbent firms were losing money, yet this is
clearly not the kind of barrier that facilitates the extraction of monopoly profits.
39. Of course, to the extent that real world behavior differs from economic abstractions,
market entry may not be as extensive as theory would suggest. One commentator has recently
argued that because American managers tend to focus on unduly short time horizons and be
overly risk averse, they are constrained from entering markets even when it would be economically
rational to do so. See Gerla, A Micro-microeconomic Approach to Antitrust Law: Games
Managers Play, 86 MICH. L. REv. 892, 903-10 (1988).
40. See Yoerg, Hill & Leddy, Panel Discussion, 54 ANirrmusr L.J. 1271, 1273 (1985).
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against the anticompetitive effects of any merger. This position has
evolved gradually. In 1982, when the Justice Department announced
its new enforcement policy, the FTC also promulgated new guidelines
for its merger investigations. These guidelines provided: "The issue
of entry barriers is perhaps the most important qualitative factor...
[but] the evidence relating to entry barriers may not always point
clearly to the conclusion that a merger should or should not be
4
allowed." 1
The FTC applied this conservative standard in several cases the
following year. 42 The opinion in In re Grand Union Co. mentioned
in the context of potential competition analysis that "evidence of
low entry barriers

. . .

may assist in rebutting a concentration-based

' 43

legal presumption,
thus anticipating the landmark Waste Management opinion.
In 1985, the Commission decided In re Echlin Manufacturing Co.44
That case marked a departure from the previous view of the FTC
that low entry barriers alone would not determine a merger's legality.
The Echlin opinion makes it clear that ease of entry is indeed
dispositive, and it represents the most thorough embrace of the Waste
Management doctrine to date.
The case involved a merger in the carburetor kit industry. Echlin
Manufacturing Company, a major supplier and assembler of kits,
intended to acquire the industry leader, Borg-Warner Corporation.
The merged firms would have controlled a 46.8 percent market share.
The Commission noted nine "non-market share factors" which it
deemed "sufficient to overcome the substantial anticompetitive potential of the acquisition inferred from market share evidence alone. 45
Some of those factors implied that the original market definition was
misleading, while others related to empirical evidence showing that
the market was competitive. The only factor which received any
discussion in the Opinion of the Commission, however, was the
conclusion that "[e]ntry barriers into the assembly and sale of kits
are very low.' '46
After making this factual finding, Commissioner Douglas' opinion
went into a detailed discussion on ease of entry. The Commission
41.

42.

STATEMENT § III A(l), supra note 8.
See In re Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 9150, slip op. at 94-97 (FTC 1983) (preliminary order);

FTC

In re Beatrice Foods Co., 101 F.T.C. 733 (1983); In re Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. 812 (1983).
43. In re Grand Union Co., 102 F.T.C. at 1063.
44. 105 F.T.C. 410 (1985).
45. Id. at 478-79.
46. Id at 478, 487-92.
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adopted the Stiglerian definition of entry barriers "as additional long
run costs that must be incurred by an entrant relative to the longrun costs faced by incumbent firms." 47 In addition to citing Waste
Management, the opinion relied heavily on contestable markets theory
and claimed that "in the absence of barriers to entry, incumbent
firms cannot exercise market power, regardless of the concentration
in the nominal 'market,' and indeed even if that 'market' has been
'monopolized' by a single firm.''48
Complaint counsel argued that four barriers to entry existed: sunk
costs, economies of scale, the lack of significant entry in the recent
past, and predatory practices. Commissioner Douglas rejected each
of them for lack of evidence and disposed of them for lack of legal
impact as well. 49 He pointed out that sunk costs and economies of
scale are not by themselves properly considered barriers to entry
since every entrant must face these costs. He admitted that the
absence of past entry might reflect the existence of barriers but noted
that such a history would also be equally consistent with competitive
conditions. Finally, he dealt with the predatory pricing argument by
asserting:
Retaliatory price-cutting and other predatory practices are unlikely
to deter entry unless there is a significant barrier to entry in addition
to the mere threat of retaliation. If there is not such [an] entry
barrier, the incumbent firms will never be able to ... recoup the
losses they suffered by selling their products below cost.50
Because of its detail, Echlin is a key case. It gives unequivocal
endorsement to the Waste Management doctrine that ease of entry
trumps concentration. The FTC has clearly gone farther than the
Justice Department in accepting the significance of low entry barriers
in merger cases.
C. Entry and Echlin Revisited
Commissioner Bailey dissented from the majority opinion in Echlin
and presented three basic objections: (1) The factual conclusion that
barriers are low was wrong; (2) the Stiglerian definition of entry
barriers is too narrow; and (3) the Commission misapplied the law

47. Id. at 485-86.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 484.
Id. at 487-91.
Id. at 490.
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in making ease of entry a dispositive issue. Though her criticisms
were not always correct, they did highlight weaknesses in the case
which the majority did not adequately address.
1.

The Height of Entry Barriers-ISay High, You Say Low"

The dissent disputed the majority's conclusion that entry into
Echlin's market is "extraordinarily easy and can be quite rapid.""2
Commissioner Bailey was struck by the poor record of entry into
the market over the past decade. She reasoned: "The market is
clearly unattractive to the new entrants best poised to make the
effort, and some factor must account for this fact."5' 3 To her, the
obvious villain was high entry barriers.
Commissioner Bailey impatiently dismissed the Chicago School
response that lack of entry is consistent with competitive pricing:
"To suggest that the failure to expand can be based on the invisible
evidence of some invisible hand is such a spectral conclusion. . . .,,4
Drawing upon the Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines, the
1982 FTC Statement on Mergers, and "traditional case law," Commissioner Bailey advanced an assessment of the historical record on
entry as "the simplest and most practical" test for determining
5
whether barriers are high or low.
The simplicity of Commissioner Bailey's test cannot be doubted,
but its practicality is dubious. A lack of entry in the past may suggest
high barriers, but it may with equal validity suggest low barriers and
a lack of excess profits. Her attack on the Chicago School explanation
as "spectral" does not rebut it. The use of historical data as the
56
sole test for ease of entry is unsound.
Simply because the dissent is wrong does not mean the majority
is right, however. In addition to labeling the existing barriers "very
low," the majority opinion in three places remarked that "there are
no barriers to entry into the [market]. 57 This cannot be an accurate

51.
52.

The Beatles, Hello Good-bye, MAGICAL MYsTERY TouR (Capitol Records 1967).
In re Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 493 (1985).

53. Id. at 500.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 498. Commissioner Bailey's suggestion has since gained some acceptance. In the

recent case of Inre B.F. Goodrich Co., No. 9159, slip
op. at 10-12 (FTC 1988), the Commission
noted the lack of past entry as one factor supporting the conclusion that significant barriers

existed in the polyvinyl chloride market.
56.
57.

See Schmalensee, supra note 28, at 45-46.
Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 480, 487, 491.
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observation. Nowhere in *the opinion was there any attempt to
quantify the level of entry barriers. 8 Instead, the Commission based
its finding on the fact that the capital investment required to start a
carburetor kit company is not large, the process is simple, the
equipment could be used for other purposes, and the industry had
some history of new entry and price competition.5 9
The Echlin opinion's use of vague phrases like "not large," "very
low," "virtually nonexistent," "extraordinarily easy," and "little
difficulty" parallels the subjective language found in Waste Management and Calmar. One commentator criticizing the treatment of entry
issues in early cases has written: "Virtually nowhere have the courts
or the FTC endeavored to estimate even roughly the extent to which
such barriers permit dominant incumbents to hold price above a
competitive level.''60 The irony is that this criticism is equally applicable to the modern cases. In the 1960s a reference to "high barriers"
simply signalled a pre-determined outcome of illegality, while in the
1980s a finding of "low barriers" or "ease of entry" gives merging
firms carte blanche. In both situations the phrases have no strict
meaning. Waste Management and Echlin are simply the mirror images
of Brown Shoe and Von's Grocery.
2.

Defining Barriers-Stiglerversus Bain

Instead of using Professor George Stigler's definition of entry
barriers as additional long-run costs which new entrants must face,
Commissioner Bailey adopted the definition proposed by Professor
Joe Bain. The Bain approach would measure the height of barriers
by the "extent to which, in the long run, established firms can elevate
their selling prices above the minimal average costs of production
and distribution (those costs associated with operation at optimal
scales) without inducing potential entrants to enter the industry.''61
According to Commissioner Bailey, "The defect in the Stiglerian
alternative is that it does not account for the time, scale and cost
necessary for a successful entry that is a meaningful threat to incumbent firms. ' 6 2 Yet the Bain definition has defects of its own. Under

58.
precise
59.
60.
61.
62.

Indeed, the Commission maintained that entry barriers "do not lend themselves to
mathematical expression." Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 482-83.
Wentz, supra note 3, at 1559.
Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 494.
Id. at 496.
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Commissioner Bailey's method, any factor which lets firms price above
the costs of production is a barrier. This is certainly too broad,
because it confuses post-entry conditions of profitability with pre-entry
conditions. For example, if a market is particularly risky, firms must
expect a premium above the long-run marginal cost of production in
order to induce them to enter. After entry, some firms will be
successful while others will fail and exit the market. The fact that an
incumbent firm is now earning profits above marginal production costs
does not necessarily mean it is garnishing supra-competitive profits. It
may simply be capturing its expected risk premium, which should be
taken into account in assessing the true marginal cost of an item. 63
have
The fact that pre-entry firms face uncertainties which incumbents
64
barriers.
entry
are
there
that
already overcome does not prove
Commissioner Bailey maintained that the essence of the Bain definition of entry barriers is "whatever allows incumbent firms to charge
supra-competitive prices yet not attract new entry.''65 This definition
is sound, though it is derivative of both Bainian and Stiglerian
notions. 6 The debate over the Harvard and Chicago Schools in this
regard centers on what is the true competitive price. What adherents
of Bain consider supra-competitive may be competitive'in the eyes of
Stigler's disciples when factors such as pre-entry risk are taken into
account. In terms of correctly measuring consumer welfare, Stigler's
definition is superior.
Though Commissioner Bailey's arguments in support of the Bain
definition are not compelling, they serve to emphasize her third
objection over the misuse of ease of entry as a defense to an otherwise
illegal merger. This point will be discussed below.
3.

Strategic Barriers

The weakness in the majority's opinion in Echlin was its shallow
treatment of predatory pricing. Incumbent firms need not price below
cost in order to increase risks to outsiders and deter entry. They need

63. See Campbell, Comments on Presentation of Richard Schmalensee, 56 ANTITRUST L.J.
53, 54 (1987). But cf. P. AREMA & H. HovEwrcMv, ANTRusT LAw 669 (Supp. 1987) ("That
incumbents once took risks and may be entitled to the fruits of their risk-taking does not justify
a merger that is likely to reduce competition among incumbents.").
64. See Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 488-89.
65. Id. at 495.
66. Schmalensee, supra note 28, at 44 (most economists follow a middle road between the
Bain and Stigler definitions).
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only make a credible threat. The dissent recognized this and pointed
out: "The few incumbent firms may have the scale economy advantages of lower unit costs, which may permit selective retaliatory pricing
that is not, strictly speaking, predatory, but is, generally speaking,
entry deterring. 67
Commissioner Bailey glossed over a major oversight in the majority
opinion-entry barriers are not always exogenous to firms. Even
without conventional, easily identified barriers like government regulation, incumbent firms can still create artificial barriers. Professor
Stephen Salop makes a useful distinction: "An innocent entry barrier
is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization. In contrast, a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to
reduce the possibility of entry." 68 These strategic barriers do not reflect
the normal cost of entering the market, and the supra-competitive
prices which result represent a real welfare loss. The majority opinion
discussed innocent barriers but largely neglected strategic barriers.
The economic literature has recognized the impact of strategic
barriers for several years now. 69 One such barrier which has received
much scholarly attention is the investment in excess capacity. Such an
irretrievable commitment of resources makes credible the threat of
price warfare. 70 This threat may deter even firms which can produce
at a lower marginal cost, if the sunk cost of excess capacity credibly
signals mutually destructive competition for a sufficient period in
response to new entry. 7'
In addition to investments which adversely affect the pre-entry
outlook for new firms, information signalling through price may also
create strategic entry barriers. In the absence of strategic behavior, a
new entrant can infer cost differentials from price differentials between
it and the incumbents. It is in the incumbents' interest to manipulate
price signals, however.72 Incumbents may temporarily price below cost,
not necessarily to predate against existing rivals, but to make longrun marginal cost appear lower than it actually is in order to discourage

67. Echlin, 105 F.T.C. at 501.
68. Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. EcoN. Rv., May, 1979 at 335.
69. See, e.g., Caves & Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: Conjectural
Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition, 91 Q.J. EcoN. 241 (1977); Spence,
Entry, Capacity Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, 8 BEL J. EcoN. 534 (1978); Dixit, A
Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers, 10 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1979); Demsetz,
Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. EcoN. Rav., March 1982, at 47.
70. Caves & Porter, supra note 69, at 245.
71. Salop, supra note 68.
72. Id. at 337.
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new rivals. Low pricing and recent exit from a market reinforce the

belief that conditions are risky73 and that entrenched incumbents have
an insurmountable advantage.
The majority opinion in Echlin is simply incorrect when it concludes
that predatory pricing is "unlikely to deter entry." 74 If the threat to
predate is backed up by a credible commitment, a formidable entry

barrier exists. The majority also uses Stigler's definition of entry
barriers too simplistically. For example, the Commission denies that
sunk costs can create barriers:
If sunk costs are considered an entry barrier, it must be because they
create a difference in the risk confronting the incumbent firms who
have already committed their resources and potential entrants who
have yet to make that decision .... This, however, is a false comparison, because the returns earned by the incumbent firms reflect in
part the risks they faced at the time they made the decision to enter
75
the market.
This explanation completely ignores the possibility that entrants may

work to increase barriers once they are in the market. Incumbents
have several strategic options which are not available to later arrivals.
The majority's analysis is static and does not treat the issue with
enough sophistication.
D.

76

Entry and Contestable Markets

One reason for the neglect of dynamic considerations in Echlin may
be the majority's reliance on a new static model proposed by Professors
Baumol, Bailey, Willig, and others, dubbed the theory of contestable
markets.77 A contestable market is one which is characterized by
73. Joskow & Klevorick, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE
L.J. 213, 230-31 (1979). A host of other strategic barriers are discussed in Krattenmaker & Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209 (1986). See also Salop, New Economic Theories of Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56 ANTrrrusT
L.J. 57, 62-63 (1987).
74. In re Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 490 (1985).
75. Id. at 488.
76. Cf. J. F~mDMAN, OLiGoPOLY THEORY 205 (1983) ("It cannot be too strongly emphasized
that entry and exit are intrinsically dynamic processes; therefore, they must be studied with the
aid of dynamic models. To claim to study entry with static models ... is not the study of entry
at all."). The Commission has recently attempted to incorporate market dynamics into its merger
analysis. See In re B.F. Goodrich Co., No. 9159, slip op. at 9 (FTC 1988) (discussing
"impediments to entry" which allow incumbents to exercise market power while new entrants
are delayed).
77. See W. BAUMOL, E. BAILEY, & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY
oF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of
IndustrialStructure, 72 AM. EcoN. Rav. 1 (1982).
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perfectly free entry and exit, equal access to technology, and instantaneous price response. Under these circumstances, concentration is
irrelevant because any attempt to increase price above marginal cost
will be met with the loss of one's entire market share to new entrants.
Such market discipline means that even a monopolist will be forced
to charge competitive prices.
Since its announcement six years ago, the theory has generated much
acclaim and criticism. 78 A major point of controversy centers on the
applicability of the theory once its strict requirements are relaxed. An
example of this involves sunk costs and time lags. Contestable markets
theory requires free exit, which implies no sunk costs. The presence
of small sunk costs does not necessarily mean that there would only
be a small deviation from perfect efficiency. Depending on the structure
of the industry, the presence of any sunk costs at all may be enough
to give the first entrants the chance to raise barriers further, thus
destroying the conditions for contestabiity. 79 These objections are
applicable to other aspects of the theory as well. Real world refinements
such as lags in entry, strategic interaction, and differential access to
technology and information may substantially limit the scope of the
theory to a few special markets. 80
As is the case with most new theories, widespread acceptance is
contingent on persuasive empirical evidence. Studies are being conducted in the airline, railroad, trucking, and long-distance telephone
service industries. Conclusive results have not yet been reported. 8'
Until the Echlin case was decided, the theory of contestable markets
had not been given judicial recognition.8 2 Government antitrust enforcers considered its application at best limited to certain regulated
transportation industries. 83 The FTC dramatically changed that state
78. See, e.g., Brock, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure: A Review
Article, 91 J. PoL.. EcoN. 1055 (1983); Spence, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry
Structure: A Review Article, 21 J. EcoN. Lrr. 981 (1983); Weitzman, Contestable Markets: An
Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure: Comment, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 486 (1983).
79. Shepard, Illogic and Unreality: The Odd Case of Ultra-FreeEntry and Inert Markets,
in ArTrrRusT AND REaOU.AION 231, 236-37 (R. Grieson, ed. 1986).
80. Id. at 231-39.
81. Id. at 239-47. But see Schwartz, The Nature and Scope of Contestability Theory, 40
OxFoRD EcoN. PAPERS 37, 47-50 (Supp. 1986) (recent empirical evidence does not support
contestability) (on file at the Pacific Law Journa); Tye, The Contestable Market Defense in
Freight Antitrust Cases, 54 TRANS. PRAc. J. 177, 184-85 (1987) (same).
82. Alpert & Kitt, Is StructureAll? 53 ANTrrRusT L.J. 255, 264 (1984); Shepard, Economics
in Court: An 8-Case Antitrust Summary, 18 ANTrrRUsT L. & EcoN. REv. 76, 82 (Spring 1986).
83. See, e.g., Schwartz & Reynolds, On the Limited Relevance of Contestability Theory,
ANTrIRusT Div. EcoN. POLICY OmFcE DISCUSSION PAPER, EPO 84-10 (1984) (on file at the Paciic
Law Journal). The Department of Justice continues to doubt the validity of contestable markets
theory. See Rule, supra note 29, at 745.
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of affairs by citing articles relating to contestable markets theory no
less than six times in the Echlin opinion. 84 This seems to be an overt
attempt to give the theory the imprimatur of legal authority. Unfortunately, the Commission's reliance is misguided. The absence of entry
barriers is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for contestability.
Other requirements include instantaneous market displacement on the
part of entrants and sluggish price response on the part of incumbents.
There is no evidence that these requirements were met in Echlin.
This does not mean that potential entrants cannot discipline the
market. They can and do. The Commission should recognize, however,
that strategic barriers may shield and sustain the limit price being
charged, resulting in excess profits. The Commission's conclusion that
there are no entry barriers in the carburetor kit market is too facile,
and its reliance on contestability theory is unwarranted.
E. Conclusion-Entry Is Important But Not Always Dispositive
The less than rigorous treatment of entry barriers in Echlin sets a
poor precedent for scrutinizing the anticompetitive effects of mergers.
The opinion states that ease of entry can defeat the presumptive
illegality of high concentration, but gives no guide as to what constitutes "ease." Nor does the opinion adequately assess the more subtle
strategic barriers which incumbents raise against new entrants. Finally,
the Commission's misplaced reliance on contestable markets theory
gives the opinion unwarranted confidence regarding the competitive
discipline which will be exerted on the market after the merger.
The Justice Department's more cautious policy toward ease of entry
is preferable. Though the Department's ease/likelihood distinction has
a dubious economic basis, the ultimate result is to view entry as
important but not dispositive. This is superior to the FTC's approach,
for two reasons. First, as the Echlin case shows, entry is a subtle and
complex subject. Analyzing the obvious innocent barriers in a market
does not settle the issue. Yet strategic barriers may be difficult to
identify and measure. 85 Second, recent economic scholarship indicates
that markets with no overt entry barriers can still support oligopolies

84. In re Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 410, 484-85, 488-89, 491 (1985).
85. See, e.g., Aryan, Sunk Capacity Costs, Long-Run Fixed Costs, and Entry Deterrence
Under Complete and Incomplete Information, 17 R" w 1. ECON. 105 (1986); FarreU, Moral
Hazard as an Entry Barrier, 17 RAND J. ECON. 440 (1986).

1988 / The Ease of Entry Doctrine
which have market power.16 Explanation of these theories is beyond
the scope of this Article, but a recurring theme is the dynamic interplay
between entrant and incumbent.
It is interesting how entry deterrence shares a certain symmetry with
the theory of contestable markets. An incumbent in a contestable
market is forced to keep prices low in order to forestall new entry.
The existence of time lags in entry characterizes the opposite situation,
in which the incumbent is able to use limit pricing and strategic entry
deterrence to keep prices high, yet forestall new entry with the threat
of retaliation. In the former case, the entrant threatens the incumbent:
"If you do not price competitively, then I will enter." In the latter
case, the incumbent threatens the entrant: "If you enter, then I will
price competitively."
Obviously, the validity of these contrasting models depends on
empirical evidence which is not yet available. It may well be that
certain markets are prone to fit one of the models over the other.
Since the empirical evidence is still inconclusive, however, radical
changes in antitrust law are not justified.
In conclusion, until ease of entry is accurately quantified and all
strategic barriers are taken into account, a vague finding of low entry
barriers should not by itself trump the conclusions inferred from high
concentration.
III.

A.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

Introduce Rigor

One recurring criticism throughout this Article has been the failure
to quantify entry barriers. The obvious solution is to define an entry
barrier as any factor (including strategic factors) which allows incumbents to price above long-run marginal cost (including a premium for
risk) without attracting new entry, and to require courts and litigants
to identify and measure the height of these barriers whenever ease of
entry is at issue in a merger case.

86. See, e.g., Radner, Collusive Behavior in Noncooperative Epsilon-Equilibriaof Oligopolies
with Long but Finite Lives, 22 J. EcoN. THEORY 136 (1980); Eaton & Wooders, Sophisticated
Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 282 (1985); Mankiw & Whinston,
Free Entty and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. EcoN. 48 (1986).
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Such measurement may be exceedingly difficult, but it would prove
no worse than defining markets, assessing merger efficiencies, or
debating the myriad of other complex issues which already vex antitrust
litigation."' In any event, it is preferable to giving judges the discretion
to rewrite merger law on a case-by-case basis. Recently, there has been
serious attention devoted to measuring entry barriers. 81 It is important
to keep in mind that the term "barriers to entry" is only a metaphor;
there are no physical "barriers" surrounding a market like a castle
wall. The "height" of entry barriers is measured in terms of cost.
Several factors can account for the cost of entering a market. Professor
Salop identifies speed of entry, economies of scale, and sunk costs as
particularly important.89 Each of these factors may be quantified and
translated into a per unit cost for new entrants.
The next step is to determine whether these barriers permit the
incumbents to exercise market power. A convenient benchmark is the
five percent test of the Justice Department Merger Guidelines. If the
barriers impose added per unit costs greater than five percent of longrun marginal cost, then entry barriers are "high." Otherwise barriers
are low, and the market is characterized by ease of entry.
A finding of ease of entry does not end the inquiry. Before permitting the merger, the court should first regard ease of entry as an
indication that the market has been drawn too narrowly. 90 After
broadening the market to a point where significant barriers exist, the
court can repeat its concentration analysis. If the market does not
exhibit high barriers at any level of definition, then the merger may
be permitted. The plaintiff should be able to counter the defense of
ease of entry by proving that the market in question is capable of
maintaining an oligopoly even in the absence of overt entry barriers.
Relating the height of entry barriers to the Merger Guidelines' five
percent test sets a clear standard, leading to greater certainty and
better enforcement. It also underscores the economic basis which
underlies ease of entry as an affirmative defense.

87. Cf. Rowe, Comment: Market as Mirage, 75 CAL. L. REv. 991 (1987).
88. See, e.g., Salop, Measuring Entry Barriers and the Rule of Reason: A Sophisticated
Approach to Merger Analysis (pts. I & 2), 15 ANrrrRusr L. & EcoN. REV. 59 (1983), 16
ANTITRUsT L. & EcoN. REv. 33 (1984). But cf. Yoerg, Hill & Leddy, supra note 40, at
1274
(trying to measure entry barriers is an "impossible task for litigators and courts"); Schmalensee,
supra note 28, at 42 (there is not yet a single, reliable method to measure entry barriers).
89. Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTrrausT BuLL. 551, 556-57 (1986).
90. See Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 252-53
(C.D. Cal. 1984); Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers and Markets: A Century Past and the
Future, 75 CAL. L. REv. 959, 978 (1987).
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B. Emphasize the Defendant's Burden of Proof
The existence of both innocent and strategic entry barriers complicates the analysis. Often, entry will not be as easy as it appears. It is
important to identify and measure all strategic barriers to entry. The
problem lies in the fact that the defendant has the burden of proving
ease of entry, and it will be in the defendant's interest to ignore or
mischaracterize strategic barriers of his own making. The testimony
of third parties and independent experts will be indispensable to any
serious investigation of entry barriers. Moreover, the difficulty of
measuring entry barriers should not work to the defendant's advantage.
All doubts should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff because of the
potential for abusing this defense. 9'
Emphasizing the defendant's burden of proof acknowledges the fact
that very few markets are completely devoid of entry barriers. 92 Unless
the defendant can present convincing evidence to the contrary, entry
barriers should be taken as given in the original market definition.

91. See Schmalensee, supra note 28, at 51.
92. See Rule, supra note 29, at 744; Schmalensee, supra note 28, at 42; Shepard, supra note
79, at 239-47.

